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Rationale and incentives for cheating in the Italian assessment system’s standardised test


The phenomenon of cheating in the Invalsi standardized tests has already been highlighted by several studies which reported significant predictors such as the presence of controllers in classrooms or the geographical location of the school in the Italian North-South gradient. However, research in Italy has not yet been focused on strategies of cheating nor in the determinants of illicit behaviour. This paper provides a further analysis that helps to orientate policies as deterrents of a phenomenon with important implications for the evaluation system: while cheating in the lower secondary high-staketests probably comes from the students themselves, in the primary school it seems to be further encouraged by teachers. In addition, the cheating seems to have a compensatory nature: high school students from less privileged schools and with more learning difficulties are helped more, or show cheating behaviour to a greater extent.

Gerard Ferrer-Esteban
Short bio: 

Gerard Ferrer-Esteban is pedagogist and sociologist, he is currently working as a researcher on education policies at the G. Agnelli Foundation (Italy). He is a member of the Interdisciplinary Group on Educational Policies (University of Barcelona) and collaborates with the J. Bofill Foundation as advisor on the Inequalities Panel of Catalonia. He has taught comparative education at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and University of Girona, and carried out research in the European University Institute and University of Louvain-la-Neuve.

07 February 2013 - 11:00

The presentation will be in English.