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Pay Dispersion and Work Performance
We collected a unique dataset from the Italian soccer league to study the effect of pay dispersion on team performance, under different definitions of what constitutes a “team”. Our results show that when the team is considered to consist of only the players who contribute to the result, high pay dispersion has a detrimental impact on team performance. Enlarging the definition of work team causes this effect to disappear or even become positive. Finally, we find that the detrimental effect of pay dispersion is due to worst individual performance, rather than a reduction of team cooperation.
Authors of this paper are Alessandro Bucciol (University of Verona), Nicolai Foss (Copenhagen Business School) and Marco Piovesan (University of Copenhagen)
Alessandro Bucciol is assistant professor of Econometrics at the University of Verona since 2009. Currently he is also Netspar fellow and adjunct professor at the University of Padua. He obtained a PhD in Economics and Management at the University of Padua in 2007. In the past he had visiting research positions at Boston University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and post-doc research positions at the University of Padua and the University of Amsterdam. His research interests are in households’ saving and portfolio decisions (in particular financial risk), behavioral economics (incentive schemes) and welfare analysis (pension systems). He published articles on these topics in the Review of Economics and Statistics, the Journal of the European Economic Association, the Journal of Economic Psychology and other journals.
IRVAPP/Fondazione Bruno Kessler - Via Santa Croce 77 - Trento
The presentation will be in English.